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Home » Resolution of the Round Table “Theological Aspects of the Doctrine/Ideology of the ‘Russian World’”

Resolution of the Round Table “Theological Aspects of the Doctrine/Ideology of the ‘Russian World’”

Based on the results of the discussion held on April 25, 2024, at the Kyiv Orthodox Theological Academy, the participants of the Round Table “Theological Aspects of the Doctrine/Ideology of the ‘Russian World’” formulated the following conclusions and practical recommendations:

  1. The current Russo-Ukrainian war, which has been going on for more than 10 years, is based on the ideology of the “Russian World”, which has its roots in the early 16th century and is in fact a modernized version of the doctrine of “Moscow is the Third Rome.”
  2. To substantiate the Russian Federation’s claims to global domination, a quasi-religious doctrine was constructed that positions Russia as a defender of Orthodox spirituality against “Western values.” The Russian Orthodox Church took an active part in the formation of the modern version of the hybrid ideology of the “Russian world” in the late twentieth century. It organized the World Russian People’s Council in 1993, and it still determines the agenda of the World Russian People’s Council, which is chaired by the Moscow Patriarch. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, when the founder of the World Russian People’s Council, Kirill Gundyaev, was elected Patriarch of Moscow, the ROC has led this process.
  3. The ideology of the “Russian world” was formalized and articulated in the “Edict” of the 25th World Russian People’s Council “The Present and Future of the Russian World” adopted in March 2024. Based on this document, the “Russian world” can be defined as ideological Nazism. According to the logic of the “Edict,” Ukraine cannot be an independent state, Ukrainians and Belarusians do not exist (they are part of the “Russian people”), and Russia is a “spiritual civilization” that fights against the “world evil of the West.” Despite the strong emphasis on Russia’s rootedness in the traditions of Orthodoxy, the text of the “Edict” does not contain any references to God and Christ, the Virgin Mary, the Church, saints, etc. Instead of these fundamental categories of the Christian faith, the document appeals to abstract “spiritual and moral points of view,” “traditional values,” and secular ideologemes such as “Russian civilizational identity,” “collective West,” “unified Russian space,” “triunity of the Russian people,” and “the fight against globalism and the collective West,” etc.

While being openly anti-Christian in nature, promoting xenophobia and violence for the sake of another social experiment, the document also declares a special messianic role for the Russian state, the Russian people, and the “Russian world” as a “katechon” (“the one who withholds”), which allegedly creates a “special civilization” and “Russian civilizational identity” in contrast to the “West that has fallen into Satanism.” Today, the “Russian world” is a Eurasian political ideology of neo-imperial aggression and war which uses certain elements of Christian social teaching.

  1. The ideology of the “Russian world” has a distinctly heretical character. The departure of Moscow Orthodoxy from Christian doctrine is clearly manifested in the promotion of the cult of violence and the justification (“forgiveness of sins”) of the perpetrators, the use of the Church as a means for the secular leadership of Russia to achieve its political goals (local –  the capture of Ukraine, global – the destruction of the “collective enemy,” i.e. Western civilization), the incitement of apocalyptic sentiment among believers, readiness to destroy the world (nuclear blackmail) in order to achieve an imaginary victory, etc. In this way, the doctrinal truths of Christianity and the teachings of the Church are being replaced by historical and political myths to politically sacralise the state power of the Kremlin regime and its neo-imperial geopolitics.

The participants of the Round Table also state that the current version of the Russian world ideology has already crossed even the boundaries of ethnophyletic heresy and is rapidly moving away from Christian doctrine. In its content, this system gravitates towards dualistic religions, such as Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, or near-Christian Gnostic movements, where the leading role is played by the same “single evil principle” in its eternal struggle with good.

  1. The creation by the Moscow Patriarchate of a new “theology of war” (“holy war”) is increasingly resembling the creation of a new “civil religion” with the cult of the “Moscow/Russian state” and “holy (triune) Russia”, where Christian values are deliberately pushed to the background to achieve the aggressive goals of the political leadership of the Russian Federation.

The basic ideas (“dogmas”) of this new religion are the doctrine of millennial existence (“from Vladimir to Vladimir”); identification of the term “Rus” with “Russian statehood” (“Rus is Russia”); messianism and the cult of “Holy Rus” as a “withholder” (“katechon”); the cult of Victory and the myth of fascists (not real or historical, but invented to achieve Russians’ own goals) as the embodiment of global evil; the Gnostic-Manichaean vision of history as a radical binary confrontation between good and evil, where Russia is a “besieged fortress”; a model of history where Russia is the embodiment of the Absolute Spirit and where there are “real peoples” (“great powers”) and “fictional peoples”; the myth of Muscovy/Russia as a defender of oppressed peoples (Orthodox, Slavs, etc.) against oppressors (Catholics, non-Slavs, the West, etc.). In addition, the unity of “Holy Rus” is not the historical unity and cultural tradition of the Christian European civilization of Rus-Ukraine, nor its connection and continuity with the Moscow Kingdom and the Russian Empire, but rather a historical and mythological reality and an artificial ideological construct of some mythical “Russian unity” or “civilizational identity.”

This new civil (political) religion uses the Orthodox context as one of the spheres of dissemination, use, and legitimization of its own domination.

  1. In view of this, the “Russian world” poses a threat not only to the entire Christian world, but also to humanity. This has been repeatedly pointed out by well-known theologians from around the world (see Declaration on the ‘Russian World (Russkii mir) Teaching). Both the Council of Bishops of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (May 24, 2022) and the Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (February 14, 2024) drew attention to the heresy of ethnophyletism, which infects the ROC. The All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations has repeatedly mentioned the threat of the Russian World ideology (“Statement of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations on the Condemnation of the Documents of the ‘World Russian People’s Council’ Containing Justification of Russian Aggression against Ukraine,” March 29, 2024).
  2. The task of today’s Ukrainian intellectuals should be to deconstruct the Russian grand narrative of the “Russian world” and demonstrate its artificiality in comparison to the Ukrainian world, which cannot develop in opposition to the Russian narrative, because the Ukrainian grand narrative began to take shape when the Moscow state did not yet exist. If the Russian Federation ceases to exist in its current form, nothing fundamental should change in our positive grand narrative (self-image, plans for the future, strategy for building the country, etc.), in which Ukraine will continue to be a self-sufficient, free country whose existence and goals do not depend on its enemies or competitors.
  3. We appeal to the Bishops’ Council of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine to provide a theological assessment of the ideology of the “Russian world” not only as an ethnophyletic heresy, but also as a doctrine that takes not only the leadership but the entire Russian Orthodox Church, which is now actively supporting this ideology (or rather, “civil religion”), beyond the bounds of Orthodox Christianity.
  4. We appeal to the leadership of higher religious educational institutions of all Сhurches and religious organizations, as well as other educational institutions operating in Ukraine, with a proposal to introduce into their courses (disciplines) separate components analysing the ideology of the “Russian world” and its destructive impact on the development of religious organizations or the country as a whole, and on each individual.
  5. We appeal to Ukrainian parliamentarians to provide a legal definition of the concept of the Russian World ideology, which poses a threat to the national security of Ukraine and has a harmful impact on the life and health of its citizens, so that organizations and individuals who promote this ideology or its components are held accountable under Ukrainian law.